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The allocation of production across firms is a potentially 
important explanation of the productivity gap between 
rich and poor economies. Reforms to trade policy and the 
domestic financial sector are often both key elements of 
policy packages aimed at reducing productive distortions. 
However, the impact of each reform in reallocating 
production within an economy is usually analyzed 
independently. This paper asks how do such general 
equilibrium effects of trade and domestic financial sector 
reforms interact in terms of their effects on productivity, 
wages and utility. Motivated by recent firm-level studies, 
I add two-way linkages between firms’ production and 
exporting decisions and their financial constraints to a 
general equilibrium heterogeneous firm trade model. The 
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Abstract
The allocation of production across ﬁrms is a potentially important explanation
of the productivity gap between rich and poor economies. Reforms to trade policy
and the domestic ﬁnancial sector are often both key elements of policy packages
aimed at reducing productive distortions. However, the impact of each reform in
reallocating production within an economy is usually analyzed independently. This
paper asks how do such general equilibrium eﬀects of trade and domestic ﬁnancial
sector reforms interact in terms of their eﬀects on productivity, wages and utility.
Motivated by recent ﬁrm-level studies, this paper add two-way linkages between
ﬁrms’ production and exporting decisions and their ﬁnancial constraints to a gen-
eral equilibrium heterogeneous ﬁrm trade model. The interaction eﬀects between
reforms appear qualitatively important. Trade and domestic ﬁnancial sector re-
forms have complementary eﬀects on the average productivity and size of domestic
producers. However, if much reallocative work has already been done through a
well-functioning ﬁnancial sector, the marginal beneﬁts of trade liberalization for
wages and household utility are reduced. Improvements in the ability to use ex-
ports as pledgeable collateral enhance both the wage and productivity eﬀects of
trade reforms. The model also highlights the potential for ﬁnancial sector reforms
in one economy to be exported via the trade channel, aﬀecting decisions to produce
or export in the foreign economy and putting downward pressure on foreign real
wages.
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11 Introduction
The eﬃcient allocation of production across ﬁrms matters for aggregate total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). Distortions which shift resources from more to less productive ﬁrms can
have a sizeable impact on TFP and hence on average output per worker and welfare. For
example, it is estimated that removing such resource misallocations could increase TFP
in China by 25-40% and in India by 50-60% (Hsieh & Klenow, 2007).1 Improvements
of such magnitudes are equivalent to substantial reductions in the relative productivity
gaps compared to the US, moving relative TFP in both countries from around 40% to
60% of the US level (based on the 2004 aggregate TFP estimates of Jorgenson & Vu,
2007). Many of the wide-ranging structural reforms across developing and transition
economies in recent decades have been focused on reducing distortions to the allocation
of production. Although reforms to trade and domestic ﬁnancial sectors are often both
key elements of such policy packages, the respective related empirical and theoretical
literatures have generally abstracted from the potentially important reallocative eﬀects
of contemporaneous reforms in the other sector. Thus, a fundamental policy question
of how reforms interact in terms of their impact on aggregate productivity, wages and
welfare cannot be addressed.
The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework to analyze this is-
sue through adding ﬁnancial constraints to a two-country (non-symmetric) heterogeneous
ﬁrm trade model. In order to do so I add a number of novel, empirically relevant, features
to a baseline heterogeneous ﬁrm trade model adapted from Melitz (2003). The ﬁrst is to
consider intermediate production as owned and operated by heterogeneous entrepreneurs
whose borrowing is subject to credit constraints due to agency problems. The second
is to allow these agency problems to vary with the composition of the entrepreneur’s
production between domestic output and exports. This introduces a two-way linkage
between a ﬁrm’s export decision and its ﬁnancial constraints as suggested by ﬁrm-level
survey data. I then examine the steady state general equilibrium interactions of the real-
locative impacts of trade and domestic ﬁnancial sector reforms (considered as reductions
in variable trade costs and relaxations in credit constraints respectively).
The interaction eﬀects between trade reforms and domestic ﬁnancial sector reforms
appear qualitatively important. On the one hand, trade and domestic ﬁnancial sector
reforms can have complementary eﬀects in increasing the average productivity and size
of producing entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurs face less restrictive credit constraints as
a result of ﬁnancial sector reforms then investment can increase more in response to a
lowering of variable export costs. With ﬁxed factor supplies, a greater reallocation from
low to high productivity entrepreneurs is thus required in order to maintain factor market
equilibrium. As a result, the positive eﬀects of trade liberalization on average productivity
and producer size are enhanced if domestic ﬁnancial sector reforms are more advanced.
On the other hand, in such a case the marginal gains for wages and household utility
as a result of trade liberalization are reduced. If credit constraints are less restrictive
then eﬀective borrowing costs are lower, intermediate prices are reduced and real wages
1These estimates are derived from a movement to ‘US eﬃciency’ based on the distribution of
marginal products of capital for plants within sectors. In turn, in a model calibrated to US data,
Restuccia & Rogerson (2007) ﬁnd similar order aggregate TFP eﬀects of distortions to prices faced by
individual plants.
2are higher. Thus, the marginal beneﬁts of trade liberalization in lowering prices and
increasing real wages are reduced if much reallocative work has already been done through
a well-functioning domestic ﬁnancial sector. In terms of the potential linkage between
exports and credit constraints, improvements in the relative ability to pledge exports to
creditors amplify the beneﬁts of trade liberalization. A further insight of the paper is that
even in ﬁnancial autarky the ﬁnancial development of not just the domestic economy but
also its trading partner can play a role in determining the real wages and the eﬃciency
of domestic production. In particular, domestic ﬁnancial sector reforms in one economy
can be exported via the trade channel putting downward pressure on foreign real wages.
The value added of the approach adopted below is to provide a framework which
allows analysis of the macroeconomic implications of reforms in one area, for example the
domestic ﬁnancial sector, conditional on other policy variables, for example the degree of
access to international goods markets. Using this modeling approach to assess whether
the interactions between these diﬀerent reform measures have quantitatively important
empirical eﬀects is an important next step. In the rest of the paper, Section 2 ﬁrst
discusses the motivation and related literature. Section 3 then provides an overview of
the modeling approach focusing on the credit constraints that entrepreneurs face. Section
4 provides details of the model with Section 5 analyzing the steady state in trade and
ﬁnancial autarky to emphasize the key mechanisms in the model. Section 6 then opens
up the economies to international goods trade. Section 7 concludes including a discussion
of further research and empirical implications.
2 Motivation and related literature
2.1 Motivation
The modeling approach which I adopt is driven by two main features: ﬁrst, the importance
of addressing ﬁrm heterogeneity in any analysis of trade and domestic ﬁnancial sector
reforms and, second, the importance of analyzing the interactions of these two reforms.
As surveyed in, for example, Bernard et al. (2007a), recent heterogeneous ﬁrm models
of international trade are motivated by the observation that exporters tend to diﬀer
from non-exporters in important ways, for example being larger and more productive.
Surveys indicate that only a limited subset of plants export, for example around 20%
in the 1991 US Census of Manufactures (Bernard et al., 2003). There is also empirical
support for the self-selection of higher productivity ﬁrms into exporting rather than a
causality running from exporting to higher productivity, eg Clerides et al. (1998). At the
same time, ﬁnancial constraints vary across ﬁrms and recent ﬁrm-level data suggests that
the degree of ﬁnancial constraints faced by ﬁrms depends on their export status. For
example, using Spanish data Campa & Shaver (2002) ﬁnd exporters to be less liquidity
constrained whilst for UK data Greenaway et al. (2007) show that being an exporter
improves a ﬁrm’s liquidity and lowers its leverage.2 This linkage from export status
to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraints is in addition to the growing empirical evidence on the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on export levels and patterns.3 Indeed, the analysis of
2Also, using World Bank survey data from developing and emerging economies Beck et al. (2006) ﬁnd
that the problem of bank corruption as a constraint to ﬁnance is less of a problem for exporters.
3See, for example, the sector-level analysis in Manova (2006).
3Greenaway et al. (2007) suggests that the stronger ﬁnancial health of exporters can be
seen as ‘an outcome rather than a determinant of entry’ into exporting.
The importance of analyzing the interaction of trade and domestic ﬁnancial sector
reforms can be illustrated by observed patterns of policy indicators or by the joint presence
of both reforms in many of the policy packages implemented by developing and emerging
economies.4 As an example of the association between the two reforms, Figure 1 plots
ﬁve-year averages for the trade and banking sector transition indicators for Central and
Eastern European countries compiled by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD).5 As expected, the levels of the two policy indicators are positively
associated with the second panel highlighting the often contemporaneous progress on
both trade and ﬁnancial sector reforms.6 In addition, reforms in one sector can take
place at a range of initial values for policies in the other sector. Indeed, based on a new
IMF dataset of de jure reform indicators covering a wider sample of 91 countries over the
period 1973-2005, Hauner & Prati (2008) ﬁnd that trade reforms tend to lead domestic
ﬁnancial reforms. Thus analysis of trade reforms assuming perfect credit markets would
appear to be often inappropriate. Whilst summary indicators of policy stance are clearly
not perfect, for example due to the lack of information on enforcement or their aggregate
nature, the above patterns serve to highlight the empirical importance of analyzing the
potential trade-oﬀs and complementarities in the eﬀects of trade and ﬁnancial sector
reforms. Such analysis can provide insights into the appropriate design of reform packages
in individual countries and can also shed light on the political economy implications of
diﬀerent combinations of reforms.
2.2 Related literature
This work is related to three main strands of literature. The ﬁrst concerns the reallocative
eﬀects of trade reforms in the presence of heterogeneous productivity ﬁrms as analyzed
in a growing theoretical literature (see, for example, the theoretical models of Melitz,
2003; Baldwin & Forslid, 2006). In such models trade liberalization increases investment
and the demand for labor. With a ﬁxed labor supply this leads to a rise in the minimum
productivity of producers, shifts production towards higher productivity ﬁrms and results
in an increase in average productivity. This reallocative process is supported in empirical
studies such as Bernard et al. (2006) in relation to the US, Pavcnik (2002) for Chile and
Fernandes (2007) for Colombia.
The second strand of related literature concerns the reallocative eﬀects of ﬁnancial sec-
tor reforms. Theoretical models, such as Almeida & Wolfenzon (2005) and Caselli & Gennaioli
(2006), illustrate how domestic ﬁnancial development (for example, contract enforcement
or investor protection) can promote aggregate productivity through reallocating resources
4See, for example, the chronology provided by Henry (2000) of reforms across 12 major emerging
markets in the 1980s and early 1990s or the analysis of IMF programme conditionalities provided in IMF
(2001).
5The transition indicators represent an assessment of a country’s policies and institutions in each area
against speciﬁc criteria with scores assigned from 1 to 4.33 such that higher values indicate improvements
in the policy areas towards the levels in advanced economies. Appendix A provides further details on
the transition indicators and the sample coverage.
6As shown in Appendix Figure 12, similar associations are present when controlling for country and
period ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Note: Values of the transition indicators range from 1 to 4.33 with higher values representing standards moving towards
those of advanced industrial economies. Averages taken over 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 2004-2007 (four year
average). Lines represent lowess smoother (locally weighted regression) with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
to more productive ﬁrms.7 From an empirical perspective the beneﬁcial impacts of ﬁ-
nancial sector reforms on allocative eﬃciency are supported in studies such as Wurgler
(2000), Galindo et al. (2007) and Abiad et al. (2007). For example, the latter paper ﬁnds
domestic ﬁnancial sector liberalization to be associated with an improvement in the eﬃ-
ciency of the allocation of production (indicated by a fall in the dispersion of Tobin’s q)
in a sample of emerging economies.8
The third strand of related literature concerns the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on
trade. This work builds on the analysis of Kletzer & Bardhan (1987) which provides
one of the earliest theoretical papers to emphasize the impact of ﬁnancial institutions
on patterns of comparative advantage. Subsequent empirical papers, most recently using
sector-level data, such as Beck (2003), Hur et al. (2006) and Manova (2006), support
the view that ﬁnancial frictions are an important determinant of trade ﬂows. As the
trade literature has moved towards heterogeneous ﬁrm models such as Melitz (2003) so
a number of recent papers have used such frameworks to analyze the role of ﬁnancial
frictions in determining export patterns, for example Chaney (2005), Manova (2006) and
Suwantaradon (2008).9 Chor et al. (2007) extend this approach to consider how ﬁnancial
frictions in host economies aﬀect exporting and foreign direct investment patterns within
a three-country model. Whilst based on a similar broad modeling framework, this paper
diﬀers from these related papers in a number of important features. First, the focus
7Also, in the context of international ﬁnancial sector reforms, Aoki et al. (2006) emphasize that
the impact of capital account liberalization in shifting production across high and low productivity
entrepreneurs is dependent on the development of the domestic ﬁnancial sector.
8Abiad et al. (2007) also ﬁnd that trade openness improves the allocation of production across ﬁrms
but the issue of the interaction of the two reforms is not addressed.
9Suwantaradon (2008) highlights how ﬁnancial frictions lead to selection into exporting and production
based on both a ﬁrm’s net worth and productivity, compared to solely productivity in the standard Melitz
set-up.
5here is on the general equilibrium macroeconomic eﬀects of the interaction of trade and
ﬁnancial reforms rather than solely the role of ﬁnancial frictions in determining selection
decisions into exporting or foreign direct investment.10 Second, in line with the empirical
evidence, I allow for two-way interactions between exporting and ﬁnancial constraints
(ie exporting decisions play a role in the credit constraints which in turn inﬂuences the
decision whether to export). Third, I solve for a non-symmetric rather than symmetric
equilibrium to allow for the more realistic and policy-relevant case where the level of
ﬁnancial development and trade costs may vary across countries.11
3 Overview of modeling approach
There are two economies in the model, home and foreign, who may trade intermediate
goods. The primary feature of the model is the set of heterogenous entrepreneurs in
each economy which produce, with varying productivity, intermediate goods using labor
inputs.12 As in the standard set-up of Melitz (2003), depending on her productivity an
entrepreneur may choose to produce output for the domestic market or to pay additional
costs to access also export markets. However, as the entrepreneur’s investment is subject
to ﬁnancial constraints, her production decisions link domestic ﬁnancial conditions and
international trade.
In order to capture the eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions on the productive sector I consider
intermediate producers as entrepreneurs who maximize their own utility and operate
and own their own projects. For simplicity, as in Chaney (2008), I abstract from entry
and exit decisions which can be analyzed within the standard Melitz model through the
assumption of perfect competition in the productive sector and a ﬁxed cost of entry.
Agency problems, such as inalienability of human capital or ex post moral hazard etc.,
limit a ﬁrm’s access to ﬁnance. The extent of these borrowing constraints may diﬀer
with a creditor’s nationality. This may be due to diﬀerent legal systems or diﬀerent
informational and transaction costs. The degree of borrowing constraints may also vary
with the type of pledgeable output, namely output for domestic or export markets. This
might reﬂect the diﬀerential ability of lenders to recover export output or to monitor
exporting activities relative to domestic output or activities respectively.
Agents in each country can access domestic credit markets consisting of one-period
risk-free debt contracts (with the underlying contracting problem assumed to yield zero
default in equilibrium). Borrowing of one unit of the home consumption good from
home creditors at time t requires a gross repayment of Rt+1 units of the time t+1 home
consumption good. Similarly, borrowing a unit of time t foreign consumption from foreign
creditors requires a gross repayment of R∗,t+1 of the time t+1 foreign consumption good.
10Related work by Hsu (2006) also examines the productivity eﬀects of trade liberalization in the
presence of ﬁnancial frictions but with symmetric economies and within a diﬀerent modeling framework
based on the transfer of ownership across dynasties.
11The three-economy model of Chor et al. (2007) also solves for a non-symmetric equilibrium where two
countries in the North are identical whilst the South country is subject to ﬁnancial frictions. However, in
this model Southern producers are restricted to domestic output only and ﬁnancial frictions only aﬀect
ﬁxed costs of production.
12It is straightforward to extend the approach to encompass capital or other factor inputs but for
simplicity I focus on the labor input case.
6I now turn to the form of the borrowing constraints.
3.1 Domestic borrowing constraint
Domestic creditors face costs relative to the entrepreneur in recovering output which
has been pledged to them. This may be due to the inalienability of human capital
as emphasized in Hart & Moore (1994) or could reﬂect costs (in terms of output) of
recovery when there is ex post moral hazard such as in Aghion et al. (1999) or costs
of expropriation in the case of ex ante moral hazard. As in, for example, Kiyotaki
(1998) and Aoki et al. (2006), these ﬁnancial frictions restrict an entrepreneur’s borrowing
so that debt repayments do not exceed the value to the creditor of pledged output.13
Creditor recovery costs may diﬀer with the creditor’s nationality and the type of pledged
receivables:
Assumption 1 Creditors in the home economy can recover a fraction 0 < θ ≤ 1 of the
domestic intermediate output which has been pledged to them by a home entrepreneur. The
corresponding fraction for domestic intermediate output pledged by foreign entrepreneurs
to foreign creditors is 0 < θ∗ ≤ 1.
The diﬀerential ability of home and foreign lenders to recover domestic outputs
pledged by entrepreneurs in their respective economies can be thought to represent both
the legal or judicial features of the economy and eﬃciency of the respective ﬁnancial
systems.
Assumption 2 The recovery rate on export output pledged to a domestic creditor is a
fraction µ times the recovery rate on domestic output in home and µ∗ in foreign with
µθ ≤ 1 and µ∗θ∗ ≤ 1.
Assumption 2 is motivated by the ﬁrm-level empirical evidence from emerging and
developing economies of the linkage between exporting and credit constraints.14 On the
one hand any additional organizational or informational problems in recovering exports
may reduce the relative ability of a creditor to recover exports compared to domestic out-
put. On the other hand, certain institutional features, such as requirements to repatriate
export revenues, could work in the opposite direction increasing the relative recovery rate
on exports. Thus I allow µ to take values greater than or less than one subject to the
restriction that the export recovery rate θµ is bounded in the unit interval (and similarly
for θ∗µ∗).
The creditor will only lend an amount such that gross repayments are less than or equal
to the recovery value of output pledged to them. Thus the domestic credit constraint for
a home entrepreneur indexed by φ can be expressed as:
13Extending the model to add tangible assets, for example, capital or land, to the production function
would provide an additional form of collateral that could be pledged to creditors. The creditor’s recovery
rates on these assets would then aﬀect the optimal ratio of factor inputs. However, if creditors were unable
to recover pledged output and could only recover pledged capital or land then ﬁnancial constraints would
only aﬀect relative export to domestic prices if domestic and exporting activities had diﬀerent production
functions.
14The requirement to pay the additional ﬁxed exporting cost could also, in a situation of hidden
information over entrepreneurial productivity, act as a signalling device of higher productivity which
could facilitate lending.
7Rt+1bt+1 (φ) ≤ revd,t+1(θyd,t+1 (φ)) + revx,t+1(µθyx,t+1 (φ)) (1)
where Rt+1bt+1 (φ) are gross repayments made by the entrepreneur in time t + 1 do-
mestic consumption goods for borrowing bt+1 (φ) at time t. The creditor can recover
a fraction θ of next period’s domestic output by the entrepreneur yd,t+1 (φ). This pro-
vides revenues of revd,t+1(θyd,t+1 (φ)) in units of the home consumption good. Similarly
revx,t+1(µθyx,t+1 (φ)) represents the maximum value to the creditor, in units of the home
consumption good, of the pledged export output yx,t+1 (φ).15 Thus exporting increases
the potential pledgeable output to a creditor but, as detailed below, requires additional
investment. In this set-up all investment is subject to the borrowing constraint. In
contrast, in Chaney (2005) and Manova (2006) borrowing constraints only aﬀect the ﬁ-
nancing of exporting costs. However, domestic production costs may also be subject to
constraints and, due to the fungibility of funds, applying diﬀerent constraints to the two
types of costs may not be appropriate.16
4 Model
Each economy is populated by two sets of inﬁnitely-lived agents, households and en-
trepreneurs, of mass L and M respectively (L∗ and M∗ in foreign).17 Both sets of agents
maximize expected utility over a ﬁnal consumption good which is produced using in-
termediate goods. These intermediate goods are themselves produced by entrepreneurs
using entrepreneurial and household labor inputs (with entrepreneurs not restricted to
working on only their own projects). As mentioned above, agents are able to access do-
mestic credit markets only. In the subsections below I ﬁrst introduce the ﬁnal goods and
household sectors which provide the context for the subsequent analysis of entrepreneurs’
optimal decisions.
4.1 Final goods sector
The non-traded ﬁnal consumption good in each country is produced using a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) combination of domestic and imported intermediate goods
which are produced by home and foreign entrepreneurs respectively. For example, home


















where yd,t(ω) is the home ﬁnal goods sector demand for an intermediate variety ω
produced by a home entrepreneur; y∗
x,t(ω) is the demand from the home ﬁnal goods
sector for a variety ω produced by a foreign entrepreneur and exported to home; Ωd,t
15The subscripts d and x will be used throughout to denote domestic and exporting variables respec-
tively.
16In Antras & Caballero (2007) ﬁnancial frictions (which apply in one sector) also apply to all pro-
duction costs although the nature of revenues does not aﬀect the credit constraint (which in their case
limits total investment to a fraction of capital).
17Foreign variables are denoted throughout by .
8denotes the set of available domestically produced intermediate goods in home at time
t; and, Ω∗
x,t is the set of available intermediate goods in home which were produced by
foreign entrepreneurs and exported to home. The elasticity of substitution in production
between diﬀerent intermediate good varieties is σ > 1. For simplicity I assume that the
elasticity of substitution between individual intermediates does not vary between foreign
or home intermediates.18 A corresponding expression holds in the foreign economy with
common substitution elasticities in both countries. Due to selection eﬀects into exporting,
the set of home-produced inputs available in home, Ωd,t, may diﬀer from the set of home-
produced intermediate inputs available in foreign, Ωx,t (and similarly for the set of foreign
produced intermediate inputs available in foreign and home, Ω∗
d,t and Ω∗
x,t respectively).
The ﬁnal goods technology is open to all agents and takes place under perfect compe-
tition. Intermediate goods are purchased to maximize proﬁts given the ﬁnal consumption
good price (Pt at home and P ∗
t in foreign) and the prices of individual intermediate goods.
Proﬁt maximization yields the standard domestic and export demand schedules for each
intermediate good ω produced in home:















where pd,t(ω) is the domestic price of variety ω produced by the home entrepreneur
with px,t(ω) the price charged for that variety when exported to the foreign country. With
zero proﬁts earned on ﬁnal goods production, the aggregate price indices in home and






































With no money in the model the real exchange rate is equal to the ratio of aggregate
prices indices in the foreign and home country, RERt = P ∗
t /Pt.
4.2 Household sector
The representative household in each economy gains utility from consumption of the non-
traded ﬁnal consumption good. In each economy the household labor endowment (L in
home and L∗ in foreign) is supplied inelastically in the domestic economy and receives a
18Relaxing this assumption does not change the results substantively if the elasticity between home
and foreign produced intermediates is above unity and less than the elasticity between varieties from
the same country. Similarly, I abstract from any bias in ﬁnal goods production towards home-produced
intermediates.
9per unit household real wage in terms of the respective country consumption good (wl
t
in home and wl∗
t in foreign). Domestic borrowing by the household (denoted by bl
t+1 for
the home household ) is chosen to maximize expected utility given wage income and debt
repayments. Household sector borrowing is assumed to be unconstrained. Whilst this
is clearly an abstraction it greatly simpliﬁes the analysis since the steady state interest
rates are then determined from the household euler equation.














where β is the household discount rate (common to home and foreign households) and
cl
t is the household’s consumption of the home ﬁnal good at time t. Consumption and
gross debt repayments (Rtbl
t in units of home consumption good) are funded from wage










The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to domestic borrowing give standard uncon-
strained Euler equations (with corresponding equations for the foreign household). With
log utility the household consumes a fraction (1 − β) of wealth in each period (ie the
return on last period savings plus the discounted present value of future wage income).
4.3 Entrepreneurial sector
Similar to households, entrepreneurs maximize expected utility over consumption and
supply one unit of entrepreneurial labor in each period for which they receive an en-
trepreneurial real wage (we
t in home and we∗
t in foreign). An entrepreneur’s labor can
be supplied to any producer, ie it is not restricted to use in the operation of the en-
trepreneur’s own production project.19 However, a number of crucial characteristics dis-
tinguish entrepreneurs from households. First, they have access to an investment project
by which they can produce intermediate goods for domestic and export markets. Second,
entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in the productivity with which they produce interme-
diate goods indexed by φ. The productivity distribution is invariant with cumulative
distribution function G(φ) and density function g (φ). Third, as discussed in Section 3,
entrepreneurs face credit constraints which are aﬀected by their choice over investment
projects. Finally, entrepreneurs are more impatient than households.
4.3.1 Investment projects
In each period the entrepreneur can choose to invest in a variety of projects. First,
the entrepreneur may choose not to produce and simply save through domestic savings
yielding a gross rate of return of Rt. Second the entrepreneur can invest in the production
of intermediate goods for the domestic market. Third, the entrepreneur may choose to
invest in production for both the domestic and export markets (given the cost structure
detailed below an entrepreneur will never produce for domestic markets only).
19Entrepreneurial labor income is required so that those entrepreneurs who do not produce in the
steady state and are constrained to zero borrowing have positive consumption levels.
10Similar to the multiple factor version of Melitz (2003) developed in Bernard et al.
(2007b), intermediate goods production by home entrepreneurs requires a composite labor
input of entrepreneurial and household labor which incorporates both a per period ﬁxed
cost, f, and a variable cost equal to 1/φ per unit of next period output. There is a one






where yd,t+1 (φ) is next period’s production. The composite labor input is a con-
stant returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas aggregate over household and entrepreneurial labor
inputs, ll
t (φ) and le
t (φ) respectively:







where 0 < ζ < 1. Cost minimization gives a composite wage wt which represents the cost







Producers of the ﬁnal consumption good value a variety of intermediate inputs and
so, given the ﬁxed cost, each entrepreneur produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate good
under monopolistic competition. If the entrepreneur wishes to export she must pay an
additional ﬁxed composite labor cost of fx per period. Exporting also incurs a variable
iceberg transportation cost τ > 1 per unit exported. Since the ﬁxed cost of production f
is incurred whether or not the ﬁrm produces for the domestic market then the ﬁrm will
always be better oﬀ producing for both the domestic and export markets than for the








+ f + fx (10)
4.3.2 Entrepreneurial equity investment
The entrepreneur’s cost of composite labor investment in production projects, wtlt (φ), is
ﬁnanced by borrowings,ie external funds, of bt+1 (φ), and own equity investment, ie inter-
nal funds. The level of equity investment is equal to At time t, the entrepreneur’s equity
investment is equal to her net worth entering the period, at (φ), plus the entrepreneurial
wage received minus her consumption expenditure ct (φ). Thus the entrepreneur’s ﬂow
of funds is:
at (φ) − ct (φ) + w
e
t + bt+1 (φ) = wtlt (φ) (11)
An entrepreneur’s net worth entering time t + 1, at+1 (φ), is composed of the gross
returns on the equity investment made in the previous period, at (φ) − ct (φ) + we
t. I
deﬁne the gross rate of return on this investment realized at time t + 1 in units of home
consumption good as Ft+1 (φ). Thus the transition of net worth is given by:
at+1 (φ) = Ft+1 (φ)(at (φ) − ct (φ) + w
e
t) (12)
11The gross return varies with the entrepreneur’s investment choice. Consider the case
where the entrepreneur chooses to produce for domestic and export markets. In this
case, the gross return represents total real revenues from production minus gross debt
repayments:
at+1 (φ) = yd,t+1 (φ)pd,t+1 (φ) + yx,t+1 (φ)px,t+1 (φ) (13)
− Rt+1bt+1 (φ)
where the relative domestic and export prices compared with the aggregate price level
in the producer’s country of residence are given by pd,t (φ) = pd,t (φ)/Pt and px,t (φ) =
px,t (φ)/Pt respectively.
Given the ﬂow of funds and the transition of net worth, the entrepreneur must choose
how to allocate her net worth state variable at between consumption ct (φ) and equity





s−t ln(ct (φ)) (14)
The entrepreneurial discount rate, δ, is assumed common across countries with en-
trepreneurs assumed to be more impatient than households ie δ <β where β is the house-









Combined with the net worth transition equation this yields the standard results
with log utility that current consumption is a ﬁxed fraction (1 − δ) of current wealth
(deﬁned as net worth plus the value of future entrepreneurial labor income discounted
by gross project returns). Using the Euler equation (15) and net worth transition (12),
the entrepreneur’s utility maximizing investment project choice is that with the highest
return Ft+1 (φ).
4.3.3 Optimal investment project choice
The returns from the diﬀerent investment projects are derived from the entrepreneur’s
optimal choices over borrowing levels and production levels. This maximization is subject
to the ﬂow of funds (11), the net worth transition (12) and deﬁnition of the gross equity
investment return (13), domestic borrowing constraints (1), the demand from domestic
and overseas ﬁnal goods producers (3 and 4 respectively).
For the home entrepreneur, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to domestic borrow-
ing bt+1 (φ) is :
20A lower eﬀective discount factor for entrepreneurs can equivalently be rationalized by assuming a
death probability π such that δ = πβ and that a new generation of entrepreneurs are born each period
such that the total population of entrepreneurs remains constant. The assumption of a lower discount
rate for entrepreneurs is widely adopted in the related literature on ﬁnancial constraints to ensure that
the entrepreneur can never fully self-ﬁnance her investment.
121/ct (φ) =
(






t (φ) is the multiplier on the domestic borrowing constraint (with correspond-
ing complementary slackness condition holding).
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to domestic production, yd,t+1 (φ), and export






















How do prices diﬀer from the case with no credit constraints? First, credit constraints
introduce an additional pricing wedge vt+1 (φ) > 1 over the standard unconstrained
marginal cost plus ﬁxed mark-up pricing rule. For example, for domestic production, the
unconstrained relative price of a home entrepreneur pd,t+1 (φ) =
wtRt+1σ
φ(σ−1) . The additional
wedge added to domestic prices due to credit constraints is increasing in the cost of














A similar additional pricing wedge applies to export prices whose value also depends on
the relative recovery rate on export output µ.
Second, compared to the case without credit constraints, export prices diﬀer from
domestic prices due not only to the variable trade costs but also the diﬀerences in their
respective pricing wedges. In turn these pricing wedges depend on the diﬀerent treatment
of export revenues to domestic revenues by creditors.22
Given the above optimal decisions of the entrepreneur it is possible to deﬁne the dif-
ferent possible values of the gross return Ft+1 (φ) associated with the diﬀerent investment
options. Comparison of these returns yields the optimal entrepreneurial choice between
no production (yielding return F 1
t+1 (φ) = Rt+1); domestic only production (yielding re-
turn F 2
t+1 (φ)), and; domestic and export production (yielding return F 3
t+1 (φ)). Let the
set of entrepreneurs in home and foreign be denoted Ω and Ω∗ respectively. The set of
home entrepreneurs who produce goods for domestic ﬁnal goods producers, Ωd,t+1 (where
Ωd,t+1 ⊆ Ω), are the subset for whom F 2
t+1 (φ) ≥ F 1
t+1 (φ) and the set who also export
to foreign ﬁnal goods producers, Ωx,t+1 (where Ωx,t+1 ⊆ Ωd,t+1), are those for whom
21In the absence of aggregate uncertainty and given the CES demand functions which the entrepreneur
faces, the choice of investment in the intermediate output project is equivalent to a decision on relative
prices.
22Interestingly, if export revenues confer a particularly strong ﬁnancing advantage relative to domestic
revenues, ie if µ is relatively high, then it could be the case that “dumping” occurs, ie export prices are
below domestic prices, despite the presence of iceberg trade costs.
13F 3
t+1 (φ) ≥ F 2
t+1 (φ) > Rt+1. The investment decisions of foreign entrepreneurs can be
characterized in a similar manner.
4.4 Aggregate conditions
In equilibrium, in each period market clearing conditions must hold in both economies for
domestic entrepreneurial and household labor markets, credit markets, intermediate and
ﬁnal consumption goods markets. Funds market clearing implies that total borrowings
within each economy are equal to zero (Bt+1 = B∗
∗,t+1 = 0). For each intermediate good,
total demand from ﬁnal goods producers must equal entrepreneurial production. Final
goods consumption also must equal ﬁnal goods output in each country, ie Ct = Yt and
C∗
t = Y ∗
t and the value of ﬁnal goods output equals the value of inputs (by the zero proﬁt
condition for ﬁnal goods producers). In addition to these market clearing conditions, the
home and foreign aggregate pricing equations (Equation 5) must be satisﬁed. Finally, to
close the model the balance of payments must be in equilibrium, ie with ﬁnancial autarky












x,t (φ)dφ = 0 (20)
4.5 Equilibrium denition
To summarize, given household and entrepreneurial debt repayments and production
levels entering period t, an equilibrium is deﬁned by a path of aggregate relative prices
{RERt,wt,w∗




entrepreneurial investment choices as reﬂected in intermediate goods relative prices {pd,t+1 (φ),
px,t+1 (φ), p∗
d,t+1 (φ), p∗
x,t+1 (φ)}, entrepreneurial credit constraint multipliers {λ1
t (φ),
λ∗1
t (φ) }, ﬁnal goods producer intermediate input demands {yd,t(φ), yx,t(φ),y∗
d,t(φ)
,y∗
x,t(φ)}, household and entrepreneurial consumption levels {cl
t, ct (φ), c∗l
t , c∗
t (φ)} and
borrowing by home and foreign households and entrepreneurs {bl
t+1, bt+1 (φ), bl∗
∗,t+1,
b∗
∗,t+1 (φ) } which are consistent with the optimal choices of households, entrepreneurs and
ﬁnal goods producers described above and which satisfy the above aggregate equilibrium
conditions. In the sections below I focus on the properties of the steady state equilibrium
given my interest in the long-run impact of the interactions between ﬁnancial sector and
trade reforms.
5 Domestic nancial reforms with trade autarky
In order to illustrate the channels through which domestic ﬁnancial reforms aﬀect ag-
gregate productivity I ﬁrst analyze the properties of the steady state equilibrium with
ﬁnancial and trade autarky. Each entrepreneur’s productivity is invariant and so, with
stable aggregate variables, the entrepreneurial project choice decision (and hence ag-
gregate value of production) will be constant provided each entrepreneur’s net worth is
stable. In this case, each entrepreneur’s consumption is also stable and so aggregate con-
sumption will be stable if household consumption is unchanging. This gives the familiar
14condition from the household Euler equations R = R∗ = 1/β. Given the assumption that
entrepreneurs are more impatient than households then from the entrepreneurial ﬁrst
order conditions all entrepreneurs will be constrained by their respective domestic bor-
rowing constraints. I can now pin down entrepreneurial prices and production decisions
which, along with aggregate relative prices, can be used to specify the equilibrium.
5.1 Entrepreneurial production decisions
Substituting the steady state multiplier on the borrowing constraint λ1 (φ) = (1/R −
δ)/c(φ) > 0 into the optimal relative prices expressions (17 and 18) gives steady state





where Θd = δ + (β − δ)θ
−1
 and ρ = (σ − 1)/σ. The term Θd can be thought as the
reciprocal of the eﬀective borrowing rate faced by entrepreneurs (as credit constraints fall
the eﬀective borrowing rate falls to the unconstrained rate of 1/β). Thus, with a common
θ, in the steady state the pricing wedges are constant across entrepreneurs. Using the
intermediate good demand functions these prices determine entrepreneurial production
levels and revenues.
The comparison between an entrepreneur’s gross returns from saving and from produc-
tion of intermediates for domestic sale gives the familiar condition that the entrepreneur
will only produce if her revenues exceed the borrowing costs associated with production.
This is the case provided that the entrepreneur’s productivity is suﬃciently high, φ ≥ φd
where φd is deﬁned by:












Entrepreneurs who have a productivity lower than φd do not produce and, given
that their credit constraints still bind, end up in the steady state just consuming their
entrepreneurial wage each period. The mass of producing entrepreneurs is given by
M (1 − G(φd)). Following Melitz (2003), aggregate productivity,   φ(φd), can be deﬁned
as a weighted average of the productivities of producing entrepreneurs:23












A tightening of the credit multiplier on domestic revenues (ie fall in θ) has two partial
equilibrium eﬀects on the cutoﬀ through raising the entrepreneur’s cost of production
and hence price. On the one hand the higher price charged by the entrepreneur reduces
revenues, increasing the term (ρΘd)
1−σ. On the other hand higher prices are reﬂected in
23As detailed in Melitz (2003),   φ(φd) is the weighted harmonic mean of producing entrepreneurs’
productivities with the weights given by their relative output shares.
15reduced investment needs and hence repayments (increasing the term (β − ρΘd)). Whilst
the former would tend to increase the productivity cutoﬀ the latter may reduce the cutoﬀ.
In partial equilibrium, the net eﬀect of these two forces is such that the former eﬀect
dominates and the partial derivative of the domestic productivity cutoﬀ with respect to




φd (1 − θ)(β − δ)
2
Θd (β − ρΘd)
< 0
Note that these comparative statics ignore the general equilibrium eﬀect of ﬁnancial
development on the cutoﬀ via aggregate prices and quantities. This is an important
omission since, as shown below, the general equilibrium eﬀect will tend to mean that
higher ﬁnancial development leads to a higher domestic production productivity cutoﬀ.
5.2 Properties of the steady state autarky equilibrium
Using the properties of the intermediate demand functions, the autarky equilibrium can
be deﬁned by a system of ﬁve equations in the real wage, domestic interest rate, domes-
tic production cutoﬀ, aggregate borrowing and ﬁnal goods output. The corresponding
equations are the household euler equation, the productivity cutoﬀ deﬁnition, labor and
credit market clearing conditions and the aggregate pricing equation.
Proposition 1 In ﬁnancial and trade autarky, there exists a unique steady state equilib-
rium in home referenced by relative prices {w,R}, the domestic production cutoﬀ {φd}
and aggregate quantities {Y,B} from which all other endogenous variables can be derived.
With domestic ﬁnancial sector reforms (ie increases in the credit multiplier θ) the steady
state comparative statics are as follows:
• Average productivity of intermediate output rises through a reallocation of produc-
tion towards more productive ﬁrms as the domestic production productivity cutoﬀ,
φd, increases.
• Real wages increase.
• Aggregate consumption of the ﬁnal good rises.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Thus by adding a simple credit constraint within this heterogeneous ﬁrm model,
ﬁnancial sector reforms increase real wages and average productivity through a realloca-
tive process very similar to that emphasized in relation to trade liberalization. With
households unconstrained, all the reallocative work is done by the wage rate and labor
markets.24 If the credit multiplier is relaxed then, for a given wage, entrepreneurs lower
their prices, increasing revenues and proﬁts. The rise in θ has an intensive margin eﬀect
increasing investment of existing producers. Ceteris paribus, in partial equilibrium there
24The comparative static results for average productivity and real wages with respect to the credit
multiplier are similar to those in Aoki et al. (2006) when the credit constraint binds. However, in their
model, with households also constrained, as the credit multiplier rises there is adjustment of the real
interest rate as well as the real wage.
16would also be an extensive margin eﬀect since, with proﬁts higher, more ﬁrms are induced
to produce (see Figure 2). However, with lower prices and more varieties the real wage
rate rises. This reduces revenues and raises costs. With proﬁts reduced, lower productiv-
ity ﬁrms exit production. As illustrated in Figure 2, the overall eﬀect is an increase in the
productivity required for entrepreneurs to make positive proﬁts from domestic produc-
tion.25 Equivalently for labor market clearing to hold the mass of producing ﬁrms must
fall if the rise in θ induces greater labor demand across ﬁrms. Although the variety of
intermediate inputs falls and the wage rises, the beneﬁcial eﬀects on unit costs of higher
θ and higher average productivity lead to an overall rise in ﬁnal goods production and
consumption.
Figure 2: Impact of credit multiplier θ on entrepreneurial production in trade au-
tarky
6 Domestic nancial reforms with trade openness
The two economies are now open to trade in goods and entrepreneurs can choose whether
to export intermediates in addition to selling them to domestic ﬁnal goods producers.
6.1 Entrepreneurial production decisions
When the economies are open to trade the relative price of exports to domestic output
for a given entrepreneur is deﬁned as follows:
25Interestingly, in the model of Chor et al. (2008) the eﬀect of a rise in ﬁnancial development for a
country aﬀected by credit constraints is to reduce the productivity cut-oﬀ for domestic production. This is
because in their set-up the wage rate is pinned down by the exogenous productivity of a homogenous good
sector. Thus, absent the general equilibrium wage eﬀects, there is no requirement for the productivity
cut-oﬀ to rise to ensure that labor market clearing still holds. Instead there is an adjustment via the
free-entry condition in their model whereby the level of aggregate demand in the economy must fall to







where Θx = δ + (β − δ)(µθ)
−1
 is the reciprocal of the eﬀective borrowing rate when
export output is pledged as collateral. Compared to the standard model, the relative
price of exports now depends not just on the trade costs but how export and domestic
pledged output are treated by domestic creditors. If the relative pledgeabilty of export
output, µ, rises then the relative price of export to domestic sales falls. As the overall
domestic ﬁnancial development rises the relative price of exports rises if µ < 1, ie if the
fall in the pricing wedge is greater for domestic production, and falls if µ > 1.
Again the comparison between an entrepreneur’s gross returns to domestic production
versus those for domestic and export production gives a productivity cutoﬀ φx above
which the additional revenues from exporting as well as producing for domestic sales
exceed the additional costs. The exporting productivity cutoﬀ is deﬁned by:











The partial equilibrium eﬀect of greater overall ﬁnancial development θ and the ability
to lend against export output, µ, is to reduce φx, ie increase the propensity of intermediate



















The relative magnitudes of the exporting to domestic only productivity cutoﬀ (and
hence the likelihood of exporting given domestic production) can be decomposed into
three terms. First, as variable and relative ﬁxed trade costs increase, ie as τσ−1fx/f rises,
the relative level of the exporting cutoﬀ increases. Second, the terms RER−Y
Y ∗ reﬂect
the relative scale of demand from foreign compared to domestic ﬁnal goods producers.
The higher relative foreign demand the lower the cutoﬀ ratio φx/φd. The third term,
reﬂecting ﬁnancial constraints in the pledging of both domestic and export output, is the
novel feature compared to the related literature.
Focusing on this third eﬀect, if the relative ability of creditors to recover exports
compared to domestic output, µ, rises then the partial equilibrium eﬀect is to increase
propensity of producers to export. However, the impact of changes in overall ﬁnancial
development, θ, is ambiguous. This is because, in contrast to Chaney (2005) and Manova
(2006), domestic production is also subject to credit constraints. Thus, a rise in θ will
reduce both the domestic and export production cutoﬀs in partial equilibrium. For µ
less than one, a rise in overall ﬁnancial development from a low level initially will tend
to increase the relative exporting cutoﬀ since it has a greater eﬀect on the domestic
production cutoﬀ. As ﬁnancial development rises the elasticity of the relative cutoﬀ with
respect to θ falls. If the relative recovery rate µ is greater than one then the eﬀects are
in the opposite directions.
18In line with ﬁrm-level empirical evidence which suggests a partitioning of producing
ﬁrms into exporters and non-exporters I focus on situations where φx/φd > 1. Given
this ordering of the production cutoﬀs, home entrepreneurs can be partitioned into those
who do not produce (φ < φd), those who produce for domestic markets only (φd ≤
φ < φd) and those who produce for export as well as domestic markets (φx ≤ φ).
Similar expressions can be derived in foreign for φ∗
d and φ∗
x. The average productivity of
intermediate production with trade,   φT, can be expressed as a weighted sum of the average
productivity of domestic production,   φ(φd), and export production,   φ(φx), where the
weights take into account the relative mass of exporters to total producers and the relative
level of export production (including iceberg trade costs) to domestic production for a
given entrepreneur.26
6.2 Properties of non-symmetric nancial autarky steady state
equilibrium
The symmetric case can be shown to be unique without the need for speciﬁc distributional
assumptions. However, given that ﬁnancial reforms in particular are undertaken in a
domestic economy without the need for corresponding reforms in trading partners, it
is of more interest to focus on the non-symmetric equilibrium. Following the related
literature I adopt the empirically plausible Pareto distribution for the numerical solutions
where G(φ) = 1 − (φmin/φ)
a with φmin > 0 the lower-bound productivity and a is the
distribution shape parameter.27 Under this distributional assumption the non-symmetric
steady state equilibrium under ﬁnancial autarky is uniquely deﬁned.
Proposition 2 In ﬁnancial autarky with entrepreneurial productivity following a Pareto
distribution, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium with costly goods trade which
can be uniquely deﬁned by a system of thirteen equations in relative prices {w,w∗,R,R∗,RER},
domestic market production and exporting cutoﬀs {φd,φx,φ∗
d,φ∗
x} and aggregate quanti-
ties {Y,Y ∗,B,B∗} from which all other endogenous variables can be derived. The cor-
responding equations are the home and foreign household euler equations, the deﬁnitions
of the four productivity cutoﬀs, labor and credit market clearing conditions at home and
abroad, the balance of payments condition (ie balanced trade given ﬁnancial autarky) and
the two countries’ aggregate pricing equations.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
6.2.1 Numerical parameter values
In the numerical examples below I focus solely on the impact of diﬀerences in credit
multipliers between countries with all other parameters identical. For the production
and productivity distribution parameters I follow Bernard et al. (2007b) in setting the
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent varieties σ = 3.8 based on the estimates from
US data of Bernard et al. (2003), the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution at
26See Appendix C.1 for details.
27For simplicity the shape parameter a is common across countries (although the lower bound produc-
tivity can be diﬀerent across countries). Helpman et al. (2004) illustrate the empirical ﬁt of the Pareto
distribution and note that the assumption that a > σ−1 is required to ensure ﬁnite variances of revenues.
19a = 3.4 and the minimum productivity φmin = 0.2. The discount factors of households
and entrepreneurs are set at β = 0.96 and δ = 0.92 respectively (yielding a steady state
annual real interest rate of 4%). The share of household labor costs in total labor costs
is set at ζ = 0.985 following Bernanke et al. (1999) since entrepreneurial production
rather than their labor income is the focus of the model. For simplicity the ﬁxed costs
of domestic and export production are set equal to one composite labor unit in both
countries. Labor endowments are identical across countries with the masses of labor and
entrepreneurs which rescale the results set at L = L∗ = 100 and M = M∗ = 20 giving
an export propensity of producers of around 30% when variable trade costs τ = 1.4.28
This compares, for example, to estimates of around 21% of plants in the 1991 US Census
of Manufactures Bernard et al. (2003). In developing economies, Aitken et al. (1997)
ﬁnd that around 27% of a 1986 and 1989 sample of Mexican manufacturing plants were
exporters whilst the samples of Clerides et al. (1998) have 35% of Moroccan plant as
exporters (1984-1991), 9.5% of Colombian plants (1981-1991) and a comparable number
of 23% for Mexican plants (1986-1990).
6.2.2 Impact of reforms to home nancial sector
Before considering trade and ﬁnancial reform interactions I ﬁrst illustrate how home
ﬁnancial sector reforms aﬀect both the home and the foreign economy for given trade
costs. This aids understanding of the mechanisms through which the diﬀerent reform
policies interact. I compare the steady state equilibria with goods trade (subject to
symmetric iceberg trade costs τ = τ∗ = 1.4) under diﬀerent values of home ﬁnancial
development (ie varying the credit multipliers θ and µ) with foreign credit multipliers
constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and µ∗ = 1.
Entrepreneurial propensity to produce and export As illustrated in Figure 3, as
the home credit multipliers rise the domestic production productivity cutoﬀ in home rises
via the same channels as in autarky (ie increasing investment via the intensive margin
with the resulting real wage rise increasing costs and causing lower productivity ﬁrms
to drop out of production).29 The higher wage costs also cause the export production
productivity cutoﬀ in home to rise. In the foreign economy the impact of changes in θ all
take place via the trade channel. In particular in this general equilibrium set-up home
ﬁnancial development aﬀects not just home export propensity (which has been emphasised
in, for example, Chaney, 2005; Manova, 2006) but also the export propensities of foreign
ﬁrms, as is also the case in the three-country analysis of Chor et al. (2008).
In the home economy the rise in θ aﬀects the export propensity (ie the ratio φx/φd)
through two channels. The ﬁrst is an ambiguously signed partial equilibrium eﬀect via
the relative ﬁnancing constraints on domestic and export revenues. The second eﬀect is
through the general equilibrium eﬀect via the real exchange rate in reducing the relative
demand for foreign relative to home intermediates . In the home economy the net eﬀect in
this illustration is that the propensity to export increases with home ﬁnancial development
28Such trade costs are of similar order to the 44% estimate of border-related trade barriers in the
representative trade costs outlined in Anderson & van Wincoop (2004).
29It can also be shown analytically that the domestic production productivity cutoﬀ in the home
economy rises with an increase in the relative pledgeability of exports, µ.
20if the relative pledgeability of export output µ is low but falls with θ for low µ. In the
foreign economy it is only the general equilibrium eﬀect that is at work with a rise in
home ﬁnancial development causing a fall in relative demand for foreign intermediates
resulting in a reduction in the foreign entrepreneurs’ propensity to export. This reduces
overall labor demand and the domestic production cutoﬀ in foreign falls slightly to ensure
market clearing. Whilst these results are illustrative they indicate a potential channel
through which the ﬁnancial development in one economy can spill over to the production
and export patterns of trading partners.
Figure 3: Impact of home overall ﬁnancial development on entrepreneurial produc-
tion cutoﬀs and propensity to export
























































































































































































































Note: Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and µ∗ = 1.
Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4. The varying lengths of the plots against θ for diﬀerent values of µ reﬂect the
restriction that µθ ≤ 1 as detailed in Assumption 2.
Real wages and real exchange rate As in the trade autarky case the home real wage
rises with the home credit multiplier (Figure 4), ie the home ﬁnal good price falls. This
reﬂects a combination of lower mark-ups for existing producers and a rise in the average
productivity of domestic and imported inputs which more than oﬀset the reduction in
varieties of inputs. In the foreign economy, the direct mark-up eﬀect is not present with
the result being that the lower variety of imports contributes to a fall in the foreign real
21wage as the home credit multiplier increases. Thus the real exchange rate rises with the
home credit multipliers as home and foreign ﬁnal goods prices fall and rise respectively.
Figure 4: Impact of home overall ﬁnancial development on composite real wages

















































(b) Real exchange rate
































Note: Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and µ∗ = 1.
Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4.
Intermediate output productivity and rm size As the home credit multiplier
rises lower productivity domestic producers and exporters exit in the home economy.
This increases the weighted average home productivity of intermediate goods producers
and the average size of producing entrepreneurs (Figure 5). In the foreign economy there
is a slight fall in the aggregate intermediate productivity and ﬁrm size reﬂecting the slight
decrease in the domestic production cutoﬀ.
Exports From the properties of the demand functions for intermediate inputs, the
relative value of exports to total intermediate sales (both in units of domestic ﬁnal con-
sumption good) at the entrepreneurial level is a function of the exporting and domestic
production cutoﬀs and is identical across entrepreneurs. For a home entrepreneur this




f (β − ρΘx)






The impact of changes in θ on a home entrepreneur’s export ratio combines two eﬀects.
First there is the impact on φx/φd which, as detailed in Equation 25, embodies relative de-
mand from home and foreign ﬁnal goods producers, ﬁnancing diﬀerences between exports
and domestic revenues and trade costs. Second, there is the impact on relative net proﬁts
per variable unit sold between export and domestic sales (ie (β − ρΘx)/(β − ρΘd)). The
overall eﬀect depends on the relative ability of entrepreneurs to pledge exports compared
to domestic output to creditors. In the home economy, the illustrations suggest that
22Figure 5: Impact of home overall ﬁnancial development on intermediate output
productivity and average size of producing entrepreneurs







































































































































































































































Note: Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and µ∗ = 1.
Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4.
Figure 6: Impact of home overall ﬁnancial development on ﬁrm- and aggregate-level
export to total intermediate revenue ratios under ﬁnancial autarky
























































































































































Note: Revenues in units of domestic consumption good. Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign
credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and µ∗ = 1. Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4.
23an entrepreneur’s export ratio increases with θ if µ is high enough but has an inverted
U-shaped response if µ is relatively low as illustrated in Figure 6. Changes in home θ
only aﬀect a foreign entrepreneur’s export ratio in ﬁnancial autarky via the impact on
the propensity to export, ie via the direct trade channel. With the foreign propensity to
export falling (ie φ∗
x/φ∗
d rising) with θ this implies a decrease in a foreign entrepreneur’s
export ratio as its trading partner’s ﬁnancial development improves.
In the home economy the positive intensive margin eﬀect on exports of improved home
ﬁnancial development combines with a generally positive extensive margin eﬀect (for all
but high levels of relative pledgeability of exports µ) to give an overall increase in the
ratio of aggregate intermediate exports to total sales. In the foreign economy, the ratio
of aggregate intermediate exports to total sales falls as θ. This reﬂects both an intensive
margin eﬀect (through lower relative demand from home ﬁnal goods producers for foreign
intermediate exports) and an extensive margin eﬀect through the rise in the exporting
production cutoﬀ.
Household and entrepreneurial utility Household steady state consumption is
dependent upon household wage income and the net return on steady state house-
hold savings (which, from domestic funds market clearing, are deﬁned by aggregate en-
trepreneurial borrowing). Thus the eﬀects of changes in home ﬁnancial development on
household utility can be split into a household wage eﬀect and entrepreneurial borrowing
eﬀects. The latter can be categorized as a direct pledging eﬀect whereby a rise in θ for
given revenues will increase entrepreneurial borrowing capacity, an intensive margin ef-
fect on output via the wage and an extensive margin eﬀect on the mass of producing and
exporting entrepreneurs who are able to borrow. In the home economy a rise in θ leads to
a rise in wages and a positive direct pledging eﬀect which more than oﬀsets the extensive
margin eﬀects of higher production cutoﬀs and thus increases household utility (Figure
7). In the foreign economy, with ﬁnancial autarky, there is no direct pledging eﬀect from
changes in θ and the wage eﬀect via the trade channel leads to a fall in household utility.
Turning to entrepreneurs, the steady state consumption of non-producing entrepreneurs,
who are constrained and hence cannot borrow, is solely their entrepreneurial wage income.
The consumption of producing entrepreneurs depends on both their entrepreneurial wage
income and their proﬁts from total sales (which are increasing in entrepreneurial produc-
tivity).30 Focusing on the home economy, as θ rises wages increase which unambiguously
increases the utility of non-producing entrepreneurs. However, for given productivity
higher θ implies lower proﬁts from production as wages and production costs rise. Thus,
for low productivity entrepreneurs utility rises with θ but for higher productivity produc-
ing entrepreneurs the negative proﬁt eﬀect more than outweighs the positive income eﬀect
and utility falls with θ (see Figure 7). This feature can be viewed as similar in nature
to the interest group theory proposed by Rajan & Zingales (2003) whereby incumbent
producers may oppose ﬁnancial sector reforms because it reduces their proﬁts.
6.2.3 Interaction of reforms to trade and to the domestic nancial sector
Having illustrated how changes in home ﬁnancial development aﬀect both the home and
foreign economy in the presence of trade I now turn to the interaction of ﬁnancial sector
30Appendix C.2 provides further details on the composition of entrepreneurial steady state utility.




































































































Note: Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and µ∗ = 1.
Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4.
and trade reforms. In particular I consider the level and marginal eﬀects on the home
economy of symmetric changes in the iceberg variable trade costs and how these eﬀects
vary with the home credit multipliers (with the foreign credit multipliers set at θ∗ = 0.5
and µ∗ = 1).31 In doing so it is convenient to deﬁne a trade freeness measure TF = τ1−σ
which lies between zero and one with TF = 0 as τ tends to inﬁnity and TF = 1 for
τ = 1.
Home entrepreneurial propensity to produce and export: trade liberalization
For given credit multipliers, the impact of trade liberalization between two economies
who are already open to trade follows a similar pattern to that in the original Melitz
(2003) setup. A rise in trade freeness leads to a rise in the domestic production cutoﬀ,
a fall in the exporting cutoﬀ and rise in the propensity of producers to export in both
countries. However, as illustrated in Figure 8, the magnitude of the marginal impact
on the domestic production cutoﬀ of these changes in trade freeness appears to increase
with home ﬁnancial development. When home ﬁnancial development is relatively high
the intensive and extensive margin eﬀects of trade liberalization on labor demand are am-
pliﬁed leading to a greater required rise in the domestic production cutoﬀ to ensure labor
market clearing. Whilst the marginal fall in export prices through trade liberalization is
reduced at higher levels of ﬁnancial development the marginal impact on overall labor
demand is higher due to the looser borrowing constraint. Although not illustrated, as
in the standard model greater trade freeness increases export propensity and aggregate-
and ﬁrm-level export ratios. The impact of the level of the credit multiplier is of unclear
31Although asymmetric changes in trade costs can be analyzed within the model I focus on symmetric
changes in trade costs to reﬂect, for example, the implementation of bilateral trade agreements involving
common tariﬀ liberalization or the eﬀect of common reductions in transport costs.
25direction.
Figure 8: Impact of symmetric changes in variable trade costs on home en-
trepreneurial production cutoﬀs
(a) Domestic sales cutoﬀ




























































































































































Note: Home and foreign identical except overall credit multipliers θ and θ∗. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5
and µ∗ = 1.
Home real wages and real exchange rate: trade liberalization Trade liberaliza-
tion increases the variety of imported inputs used in ﬁnal goods production. Whilst the
rise in the domestic production cutoﬀ reduces the variety of domestic inputs they are of
a higher productivity. The net eﬀect is a fall in the aggregate price level and increase in
home real wages. The real wage gains from trade opening appear to be greater if over-
all ﬁnancial sector development is lower and, for given θ, if the relative pledgeability of
export output is higher (Figure 9). The intuition is that with θ high the aggregate price
level at home is relatively low and thus the less the impact of any additional fall in prices
due to the trade liberalization. The rise in trade freeness also increases the real wage in
the foreign economy with the marginal impact also greater if home ﬁnancial development
is relatively low. The interplay of these two relative price changes suggests that if home
development is lower than that in foreign then the real exchange rate is less than one and
is falling with greater trade freeness.
Home intermediate output productivity and rm size: trade liberalization
Additional labor demand stimulated by increasing investment in export production as
trade freeness rises leads to a rise in the domestic production productivity cutoﬀ. This
contributes to a rise in intermediate productivity and average size of producing en-
trepreneurs (Figure 10). Reﬂecting the corresponding greater marginal eﬀect of trade
liberalization on the domestic production productivity cutoﬀ these eﬀects are enhanced
at higher levels of ﬁnancial development (and at higher levels of relative export pledge-
ability for given θ). Thus, in contrast with their impact on real wages trade and ﬁnancial
sector reforms appear to have complementary eﬀects on aggregate productivity and ﬁrm-
size.
26Figure 9: Impact of symmetric changes in variable trade costs on home composite
real wages and the real exchange rate
(a) Real wages





































































(b) Real exchange rate





















































































Note: Home and foreign identical except overall credit multipliers θ and θ∗. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5
and µ∗ = 1.
Figure 10: Impact of symmetric changes in variable trade costs on home interme-
diate productivity and average size of producing entrepreneurs
(a) Intermediate output average productiv-
ity












































































































(b) Intermediate producer average size









































































































Note: Home and foreign identical except overall credit multipliers θ and θ∗. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5
and µ∗ = 1.
27Figure 11: Impact of symmetric changes in variable trade costs on steady state
home household utility under ﬁnancial autarky


















































































Note: Home and foreign identical except overall credit multipliers θ and θ∗. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5
and µ∗ = 1.
Home household and entrepreneurial utility: trade liberalization In terms of
household utility, lower trade costs increase wage income. They also aﬀect household
saving (ie constrained entrepreneurial borrowing) via intensive and extensive margin ef-
fects on total pledgeable output for exporters and domestic producers. As θ rises the
real wage gains fall whilst the extensive margin eﬀects increase (as the change in cutoﬀs
rises). Overall, these eﬀect combine to reduce the beneﬁts to household utility from trade
opening as θ rises for given µ (see Figure 11). This result is intuitive - using one policy
tool, ie trade opening, to improve the allocation of production leads to less utility gain for
consumer households if the resource allocation is more eﬃcient in the ﬁrst place through
stronger ﬁnancial development. However, the utility gains from trade liberalization are
enhanced if, for given θ, the relative ability to pledge export output compared to domestic
output is increased.
Although not illustrated, for a given level of ﬁnancial development, entrepreneurial
utility increases with trade openness. Entrepreneurial wage income rises whilst produc-
ers gain from increased demand and a greater propensity to export (despite the rise in
production costs through higher wages). In terms of the interaction of trade reforms
and ﬁnancial reforms, the picture is somewhat complex combining the relative eﬀects on
both wages and intensive and extensive productive margins. However, the utility loss for
higher productivity entrepreneurs in moving from low to higher ﬁnancial development (ie
increasing θ) which was illustrated in Figure 7 appears to be reduced when trade open-
ness is higher. This is consistent with the interest group theory of ﬁnancial development
outlined in Rajan & Zingales (2003) whereby the opposition of incumbent producers to
ﬁnancial reforms is weakened when an economy is open to international trade.32
32Rajan & Zingales also argue that opposition to domestic ﬁnancial reforms will be reduced when the
economy is open to international ﬁnance, a feature from which the current model abstracts.
287 Conclusions
This paper provides a tractable extension of a two-economy heterogeneous ﬁrm model to
incorporate ﬁnancial constraints aﬀecting both domestic and export production. In doing
so it enables analysis of trade and domestic ﬁnancial sector policy changes across countries
in a non-symmetric setting and provides some important insights into the mechanisms
through which the two reforms can reallocate production within the two economies, their
potential similarities and their interactions. In particular, numerical illustrations suggest
that on the one hand domestic ﬁnancial sector reforms, in facilitating greater investment,
can enhance the marginal eﬀects of trade liberalization in increasing average productivity
and ﬁrm size. On the other hand, at higher levels of ﬁnancial development the marginal
beneﬁts of trade liberalization in reducing aggregate prices and raising real wages and
household utility may be reduced. The numerical illustrations also highlight the role of
exports as collateral in amplifying the beneﬁts of trade liberalization and the channels
through which domestic ﬁnancial sector reforms may be transmitted to trading partners.
The analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the interactions of trade and domestic
ﬁnancial sector reforms within a general equilibrium heterogeneous ﬁrm setting provides
a novel addition to the existing theoretical literature and is complementary to a growing
empirical literature on the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on trade and FDI. However, it
also highlights the need for additional empirical research on the quantitative signiﬁcance
of these interaction eﬀects since, as noted by Banerjee & Duﬂo (2005), the question of
whether there are potential gains from adding multiple sources of ineﬃciency to models
to explain productivity diﬀerences across countries is dependent upon their empirical
relevance. The evidence from existing studies on these interactions is limited. At the
macro level, Chang et al. (2005) provide support for the complementary eﬀects of ﬁnancial
development and trade openness on growth. At the ﬁrm-level, Topalova (2004), for
example, considers whether the impact on productivity of trade reforms in India varies
across states by ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnds that although the point estimates are similar
in states with high or low credit to GDP they are only signiﬁcant in the former. Further
empirical analysis on the interaction of the reallocative eﬀects of trade and ﬁnancial
reforms and their joint impact on aggregate productivity levels is of particular interest.
A focus for future work is thus to extend the model to a multi-sector set-up to derive
empirically testable predictions on the eﬀects of reform interactions to be applied to
sectoral data on average ﬁrm-size and labor productivity. In addition to these important
empirical steps there is the potential to modify the model to address other policy relevant
issues. For example, to extend the analysis beyond the steady state in order to examine
the transitional impact of reforms or to incorporate the potential reallocative eﬀects of
international ﬁnancial liberalization emphasized by Aoki et al. (2006).
29A EBRD transition indicators
Full details of the EBRD transition indicator score methodology are available at www.ebrd.com.
The transition indicators cover up to 29 Eastern European and former Soviet Union
economies from 1989 to 2007: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hun-
gary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
The transition indicator scores are based on a judgement of an economy’s progress rel-
ative to deﬁned classiﬁcations. Scores range from 1 (little change from centrally planned
economy) through to 4+ (deﬁned as 4.33) which represents norms of advanced industrial
economies. Trade measure also includes restrictions to current account convertibility. In
addition to the banking sector measure indicated in the ﬁgures below there is also an
indicator for non-bank ﬁnancial institutions and securities markets.
The trade and foreign exchange (FX) indicator ranges from a value of 1 through to
4+ (graded by the EBRD as 4.33) with “1: Widespread import and/or export controls
or very limited legitimate access to foreign exchange; 2: Some liberalization of import
and/or export controls; almost full current account convertibility in principle, but with
a foreign exchange regime that is not fully transparent (possibly with multiple exchange
rates); 3: Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export re-
strictions; almost full current account convertibility; 4: Removal of all quantitative and
administrative import and export restrictions (apart from agriculture) and all signiﬁ-
cant export tariﬀs; insigniﬁcant direct involvement in exports and imports by ministries
and state-owned trading companies; no major non-uniformity of customs duties for non-
agricultural goods and services; full and current account convertibility; 4+: Standards
and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of most tariﬀ barriers;
membership in WTO.”
The corresponding deﬁnitions for the banking reform and interest rate liberalization
transition indicator are “1: Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system;
2: Signiﬁcant liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed
credit or interest rate ceilings; 3: Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency
and of a framework for prudential supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberal-
ization with little preferential access to cheap reﬁnancing; signiﬁcant lending to private
enterprizes and signiﬁcant presence of private banks; 4: Signiﬁcant movement of banking
laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-functioning banking competition and
eﬀective prudential supervision; signiﬁcant term lending to private enterprizes; substan-
tial ﬁnancial deepening; 4+: Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial
economies: full convergence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provi-
sion of full set of competitive banking services.”
30Figure 12: EBRD transition indicators, 5 year averages: levels and changes after
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Banking transition indicator
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Change in banking transition indicator
Note: Values of the transition indicators range from 1 to 4.33 with higher values representing standards moving towards
those of advanced industrial economies. Averages taken over 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 2004-2007 (four year
average). Plots indicate residuals from regressions controlling for country and period ﬁxed eﬀects. Lines represent lowess
smoother (locally weighted regression) with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
B Proofs
B.1 Steady state equilibrium with trade and nancial autarky
- Proof of existence and uniqueness
The steady state equilibrium in home can be deﬁned by the following system of ﬁve
equations in relative prices {w,R}, domestic market production cutoﬀ {φd} and aggregate
quantities {Y,B} from which all other endogenous variables can be derived:
Household Euler equation: R = 1/β






Funds market clearing: B = 0
Labor market clearing: LζM−ζ/f = H (Θd,φd) where H (Θd,φd) =
ρΘd
β−ρΘdA(φd)+1−




σ−1 g (φ)dφ. H (Θd,φd) is increasing in Θd and decreasing
in φd.





To prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium ﬁrst consider the labor market
clearing condition. H (Θd,φd) is continuously diﬀerentiable (provided g′ (φd) is deﬁned)
and tends to zero as φd → ∞ and tends to inﬁnity as φd → 0. There is thus a unique value
of φd for which the labor market clearing condition holds. Substituting the equilibrium
value of φd into the aggregate pricing equation uniquely deﬁnes the real wage. The
31domestic production cutoﬀ then uniquely deﬁnes ﬁnal goods output Y . The real interest
rate and aggregate borrowing are deﬁned by the euler equation and funds market clearing
respectively.
Comparative statics with respect to θ:
•
∂φd
∂θ > 0: From the labor market clearing condition, using the implicit function
theorem the equilibrium cutoﬀ value can be shown to be increasing in θ.
• ∂w
∂θ > 0: Using the deﬁnition of the real wage from the aggregate pricing equation
and the expression for ∂φd/∂θ it can be shown that the real wage is increasing in
θ.
• ∂Y
∂θ > 0: In the productivity cutoﬀ equation substitute in for wages from the ag-
gregate pricing equation. Using the labor market clearing condition with some
manipulation one obtains ﬁnal goods output as a function of φd independent of θ
giving ∂Y/∂θ ∝ ∂φd/∂θ > 0.
B.2 Non-symmetric steady state equilibrium with nancial au-
tarky - Proof of existence and uniqueness









plus the domestic production productivity






(β−ρΘd). Similar expressions can be used to deﬁne
exporting revenues in relation to φx and also for variable labor demand. The steady state
equilibrium can be deﬁned by the following system of thirteen equations in relative prices
{w,w∗,R,R∗,RER}, domestic market production and exporting cutoﬀs {φd,φx,φ∗
d,φ∗
x}
and aggregate quantities {Y,Y ∗,B,B∗} from which all other endogenous variables can
be derived:
Household Euler equations:
R = 1/β; R
∗ = 1/β (27)











































































Composite labor market clearing conditions:
φ
−a















(1 + kρΘd/(β − ρΘd))fφa
min
;Ω2 ≡
fx (1 + kρΘx/(β − ρΘx))
f (1 + kρΘd/(β − ρΘd))
with k = a/(a−σ+1). Ω∗
1 and Ω∗
2 are correspondingly deﬁned using foreign variables.
Funds market clearing conditions:
B = B
∗ = 0 (34)




































































Noting that the labor market clearing conditions deﬁne the domestic productivity
cutoﬀs as functions of exporting cutoﬀs in each country and using the balance of trade







































33Each of these equations describe an upward sloping locus in {φ∗
x,φx}. Dividing the two
equations gives a downward sloping curve which can be shown to intersect (38) uniquely
at positive values of the two exporting cutoﬀs. As mentioned I focus on the case for which
φx/φ > 1 and φ∗
x/φ∗ > 1 which implies that parameter values must satisfy ΥΥ∗ > 1.
For the equilibrium values of φx and φ∗
x the wages can be uniquely obtained from the















































Domestic production cutoﬀs can be obtained from the labor market clearing conditions
given the equilibrium values of φx and φ∗
x which combined with equilibrium wages then
determine equilibrium output from the domestic production productivity cutoﬀs. From
these variables all other individual steady state choice variables can be determined. Given
the existence of a unique equilibrium the model can be solved numerically using standard
techniques.
C Trade steady state
C.1 Weighted average productivity
As in Melitz (2003) the home average productivity of intermediate production with trade,
  φT, can be deﬁned as a weighted harmonic mean over of productivity levels reﬂecting the
additional production (inclusive of iceberg transport costs) of those ﬁrms who choose to
export. The productivity levels are weighted by an entrepreneur’s output relative to the

































1−G(φd) is the conditional probability of a producer exporting. This
expression can be simpliﬁed using the deﬁnitions of   φ(φd) and   φ(φx) from Equation 23


















τyx (  φ(φx))

















Thus, if the two economies are non-symmetric, the weighted productivity includes a
relative demand term RERσY ∗/ ̸ Y reﬂecting the diﬀerences in demand for intermediates
from export and domestic markets.
34C.2 Entrepreneurial utility
In the steady state, an entrepreneurs utility u(φ) = ln(c(φ))/(1 − δ) where the steady
state consumption level is equal to:
c(φ) = w
e + (1 − δ)a(φ) (44)
The entrepreneur’s steady state net worth is given by:
a(φ) = yd (φ)pd (φ) + yx (φ)px (φ) − Rb(φ) (45)
If the entrepreneur does not produce then, as she has no collateral, her borrowing is
zero and she consumes all her wage income, ie a = 0. If the entrepreneur producers then
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